CASE COMMENTS
ANTITRUST-PROSPECTVE OVERRULING

I ANTITRUST DCISIONS

In 1926 the Supreme Court, in United States v. General Elec. Co.,'
held lawful consignment agreements by which defendants had fixed the prices
at which agents transferred defendants' products to consumers. Simpson v.
Union Oil Co.2 decided in 1964 limited General Electric to its own special
4
fact situation involving patents.? In remanding for further proceedings,
however, the Court in Simpson expressly reserved "the question whether,
when all the facts are known, there may be any equities that would warrant
only prospective application in damage suits of the rule governing price
fixing by the 'consignment' device .

.

.

."

5 The present case, a treble

damage suit involving the use of consignment agreements to fix prices
of light bulbs, came to trial in the Southern District of New York shortly
before the decision was rendered in Simpson. The district court thought
that the consignment agreements were similar to those in both Simpson and
General Electric and that the rationale of Simpson if applied retrospectively
would require a finding that defendant Westinghouse had violated the
antitrust laws. It believed, however, that the Supreme Court had made
available the choice of prospective application of the new doctrine, and,
upon finding that the defendant had reasonably relied upon General
Electric, the court held that the new rule should not be applied in this
case. Lyons v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 235 F. Supp. 526 (S.D.N.Y.
1964).
Although rules of law are generally applied retrospectively,6 courts
sometimes announce a prospective rule where to do otherwise would cause
7
great hardship to parties who have in good faith relied on a previous rule.
1272 U.S. 476 (1926).
2377 U.S. 13 (1964), 78 HARv. L. REv. 279.
8 377

U.S. at 23-24.

4 In remanding the Court held only that resale price maintenance through what
it called a "coercive type of 'consignment' agreement" was illegal. Id. at 24.
5Id. at 24-25.
6 Blackstone is credited with being the leading proponent of the so called "declaratory" theory of judicial decision making. Under this view judges do not make the
law, but merely find it, and in overruling an earlier decision a court does not render
the previous holding bad law, but rather announces that it has never been the law.
1 BLAcKsToNE, COmmENTARIES *69-71.

7
Prospective overruling has been applied in such civil cases as: Arizona Tax
Comm'n v. Ensign, 75 Ariz. 376, 257 P.2d 392 (1953) (rule making taxable that
which had previously been held nontaxable); Parker v. Port Huron Hosp., 361
Mich. 1, 26-28, 105 N.W.2d 1, 13-15 (1960) (abolition of charitable immunity of
hospitals) ; In re Jeruzal's Estate, 130 N.W.2d 473, 481 (Minn. 1964) (rule limiting
testamentary dispositions through "Totten trusts"); Langdell v. Dodge, 100 N.H.
118, 123, 122 A.2d 529, 532 (1956) (treatment of stock dividends in wills case);
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In a prospective overruling the old rule is usually applied to the case
before the court, while notice is given that the rule has been reconsidered
and should no longer be deemed controlling.8
Though never before utilized in antitrust litigation,9 prospective
overruling seems an appropriate means of protecting the "untold numbers
of sellers of goods" who, according to Mr. Justice Stewart, dissenting in
Simpson, "will be subjected to liability in treble damage suits because they
thought they could rely on the validity of this Court's decisions." '0 In
the present case almost forty years had passed since the Supreme Court
had stated that, "the owner of an article, patented or otherwise," did not
violate the antitrust laws by selling directly to the consumer and fixing
the price at which his agent transferred title." Subsequent interpretations
have taken the view that the General Electric decision did not depend on
the presence of patents,12 and, as the Simpson dissent recognized, concf. Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 175 (1864) (denial of legislative
power to issue certain bonds); Bingham v. Miller, 17 Ohio 445, 448-49 (1848)
(denial of legislative power to grant divorces).
Since a criminal defendant may not constitutionally be convicted for violating law
so vague that it fails to proscribe clearly the acts charged against him, Lanzetta v.
New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939), he may not be convicted for activities which were
legal when committed. See, e.g., James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 221 (1961)
(change in criminal rule regarding tax reporting). Changes in the law which are
designed to have a prophylactic effect or might upset the orderly administration of
the criminal law may also be prospectively applied. See, e.g., United States ex rel.
Angelet v. Fay, 333 F.2d 12 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 379 U.S. 815 (1964) (No. 212)
(prospective application of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)) ; State v. Johnson,
43 N.J. 572, 206 A.2d 737 (1965) (prospective application of Escobedo v. Illinois, 378
U.S. 478 (1964)). But see Fugate v. Ellenson, 237 F. Supp. 44 (D. Neb. 1964)
(retrospective application of Escobedo, supra).
Compare Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953) (per curiai),
where the Court refused to overrule the earlier decision of Federal Baseball Club v.
National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922), because of reliance on the old rule.
8 See Cardozo, Address Before N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, in SELECTED WRITINGS
OF BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDozo 7 (1947).
See generally CARDOzo, THE NATURE OF
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 142-67 (1921).
Under a common variant of the practice of prospective overruling, the new rule
is applied to the case being litigated as well as to all future actions. See, e.g., Molitor
v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 Ill. 2d 11, 26-29, 163 N.E.2d 89,
96-98 (1959); Parker v. Port Huron Hosp., spra note 7, at 26-28, 105 N.W.2d at
13-15. This practice is followed because of the belief that the new rule, if not applied to
the case before the court, will only be dictum and hence not binding on future courts.
A second reason for this form of prospective overruling is the fear that parties will
not institute an action if a decision in their favor will not be to their immediate benefit.
For further discussion of the two variations and arguments favoring the general rule,
see Snyder, Retrospective Operation of Overruding Decisions, 35 ILL. L. REV. 121, 151
(1940).
See also Cardozo, Address Before N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, in SEmCTED
WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDozo 7, 34-37 (1947).
For more background
on prospective overruling see generally Levy, Realist Jurisprudence and Prospective
Overruling, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1960) ; Note, Prospective Overruling and Retrospective Application in the Federal Courts, 71 YALE L.J. 907 (1962).
9In Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953) (per curiam),
the Supreme Court could have used prospective overruling to bring professional baseball within the reach of the antitrust laws, but instead decided to continue the old
rule exempting the sport. See note 7 supra.
10 Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 30 (1964).
11 United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 488 (1926).
12 After the General Electric patents expired, the same agency agreements were
approved on the basis of the prior Supreme Court decision. United States v. General
Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753, 827 (D.N.J. 1949).
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signment agreements covering unpatented articles were always considered
within the General Electric rationale. 13 Westinghouse, defendant in the
present case, was a defendant in General Electric and simply continued
the system which had there been approved. 14
While the present case is an example of the customary practice of
prospective overruling, the vagueness of the Sherman Act's "rule of
reason" 15 and the uncertain application of many antitrust statutes 16
might tempt the courts to utilize prospective overruling in a liberalized
manner. For example, where the law is unclear, a defendant acting in
good faith might be exempted from criminal penalties 17 and liability for
treble damages.' 8 Thus in a case brought either by the United States or
20
by a private litigant,'9 only injunctive relief would be available.
One field in which the liberalized use of prospective overruling might
seem desirable is price discrimination. In administering the RobinsonPatman Act's prohibition against price discrimination between buyers of
like grade and quality,2 1 many problems have arisen because of the exacting
22
evidentiary requirements of the statute's cost-justification defense.
Both the courts and the Federal Trade Commission 2 have had difficulty
in determining the cost differences arising out of varying methods of
manufacture, sale, and delivery.2 In United States v. Borden Co. 2 5 for
13 Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 27-28 (1964); see Handler, Recent
Antitrust Developments-1964, 63 MICH. L. REv. 59, 60 (1964).
14 Instant case at 537.
'5 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911) (commented upon in
AT'Y GEN. NAT'L CoMm. ANTITRUST REP. 5-12 (1955)).
16 This uncertainty has been judicially recognized on many occisions. See, e.g.,
FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505, 530 (1963) (separate opinion of Harlan, J.) ; FTC
v. Motion Picture Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 405 (1953) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
'7 See Sherman Act §§ 1-3, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3

(1958).

18 Clayton Act § 4, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958).

19 Clayton Act § 16, 38 Stat. 737 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1958).
2
0 It should be noted at this point that a judgment against a defendant in a suit
by or on behalf of the United States will usually be prima facie evidence against him
in a subsequent private suit. Clayton Act § 5, 38 Stat 731 (1914), as amended, 15
U.S.C.
§ 16 (1958).
21
Robinson-Patman Act § 2(a), 49 Stat 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1958).
22 See Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 68, 79 (1953); RowE, PRICE
DIscRImINATIoN UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT § 10.11 (1962); ATT'Y. GEN.
NAT'L Comm. ANTrrausr REP. 171-72 (1955).
23There is a division of judicial authority on the availability of an FTC opinion,

even after affirmance in the courts, as prima facie evidence in a private treble damage
suit. Compare Volasco Prods. Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 223 F. Supp. 712
(E.D. Tenn. 1963), and Highland Supply Corp. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 221 F. Supp.
15 (E.D. Mo. 1963), rev'd on other grounds, 327 F.2d 725 (8th Cir. 1964), with New
Jersey Wood Finishing Co. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 332 F.2d 346, 358-60
(3d Cir. 1964). Even if not available as prima facie evidence, a ruling against defendant might well serve as inducement to a plaintiff considering a treble damage

action.
24For

a discussion of cost justification and its problems, see generally

BUSINESS ASPECTS OF PRICING UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
25

370 U.S. 460 (1962).

SAWYER,

113-96 (1963).
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example, defendants relied on the availability of a statutorily approved
course of dealing and made reasonable efforts to bring their pricing policies
within the protected area. Although detailed and voluminous cost studies
were prepared and accepted as sufficient by the district court,2 0 the
Supreme Court found appellees' customer classifications illegal for failing
properly to distinguish between high and low cost buyers. In such a case
appellees might have presented their good faith effort to comply with the
dictates of the statute as a basis for a prospective application of the Court's
new interpretation. Thus, relief against the defendant would have been
limited to an injunction.
Another context in which a variant of prospective overruling might
be exercised to reward a defendant's good faith is where there has been
reliance on the uncertain boundaries of an ill-defined judicially protected
area. Such a situation is presented by the questionable legality of a manufacturer's refusal to deal with retailers who do not honor requests to resell
at the manufacturer's specified prices. While written contracts imposing
the obligation to resell at fixed prices have been held to violate the
28
Sherman Act,27 the Supreme Court in United States v. Colgate & Co.
said that a simple refusal to sell to noncomplying dealers was lawful. The
lower court in that case found that the indictment did not charge any pricefixing agreements,.2 and the Supreme Court implied that without such an
agreement there could be no illegal refusal to deal.30 However, the Court
gave no indication whether it would have found an illegal agreement under
the facts of Colgate, had it made the original determination.
Any intimation that Colgate overruled or modified previous decisions
was expressly negated by the Court in United States v. Schrader's Son,
Inc.31 There, agreements to fix retail prices express or implied from a
course of dealing or other circumstances were said to violate the Sherman
Act, but it was also said that a manufacturer retained the right to suggest
m 32
The
prices and then to refuse dealings with noncomplying customers.
between
distinguishing
any
criteria
for
to
provide
however,
Court failed,
And in FTC v. Beech-Nut
agreements and unilateral refusals to deal.
26 Id. at 461.
27

Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373 (1911).

28250 U.S. 300 (1919).
29Id. at 306-07. The case had come directly on a writ of error from a district
court decision dismissing the indictment. In this procedural posture the Court said
it had "'no authority to revise the mere interpretation of an indictment and [was]

. . . confined to ascertaining whether the court in a case under review erroneously

construed the statute." Id. at 301.
3o ld. at 307.
31252 U.S. 85 (1920).
32d at 99-100.
33 Ibid. The Court in Frey & Son v. Cudahy Packing Co., 256 U.S. 208 (1921),
found that defendant had not entered into a forbidden agreement or combination.
The fact situation which led to this conclusion was not stated.
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Packing Co.34 the Court again passed over an opportunity to enunciate
guidelines for identifying conduct which made refusals to deal illegal.35
Finally, after thirty years, the Supreme Court was faced with another
case on this question.36 The defendant, Parke, Davis & Co., had been told
by its counsel that, while a resale price agreement was illegal, a unilateral
policy of selling only to customers who observed minimum resale prices
could be lawfully maintained!' 7 In a suit for an injunction brought by the
United States, the district court dismissed on the grounds that the refusals
were protected under Colgate.-" The Court, while reasserting a manufacturer's right to unilaterally refuse to sell,5 9 further narrowed the scope
of conduct arguably permissible under Colgate.40 But if liberalized
prospective overruling had been available, Parke-Davis could have argued
that a good faith effort had been made to bring its activities within the
permissible area and that even if a violation had in fact occurred, the order
of the court should protect the defendant from treble damage suits.
While liberalized prospective overruling would surely mitigate many
problems caused by ill-defined standards of legality, it might do so at the
expense of reducing the impact of antitrust laws. For courts would
undoubtedly experience great difficulty in distinguishing a good faith effort
to comply with the law from feigned confusion designed to disguise an
attempt to profit from forbidden business practices. And this judicial
inability might well cause the Government to institute several actions
against the defendant in order to effectively curb violations. Even after
judgment in Parke-Davis, the defendant, relying on the Court's holding
that unilateral refusals to deal are still legally permissible, might make
only slight adjustments in its means of enforcing resale prices. 41 While
it might then be difficult in a subsequent action for the defendant to convince a court of its good faith, the assertion of such a claim would nonetheless require a very sensitive judicial evaluation. The inability of
34257 U.S. 441 (1922).
85 Id. at 452-53. Even though Beech-Nut arose under § 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 38 Stat. 719 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1958), which provides for a
standard of illegality based on unfair methods of competition rather than on restraint
the Court viewed the conduct in light of prior Sherman Act cases.
of trade,
36
3 United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
Id. at 33.
38 Id.at 31, 36.
3 Id. at 44.
The
40 See The Supreme Court, 1959 Term, 74 HAv. L. REV. 164 (1960).
dissent in Parke-Davis said that the "Court has done no less than send to its demise
the Colgate doctrine which has been a basic part of antitrust law . . . ." 362 U.S.

at 4941(Harlan, J., dissenting).
This situation would be analogous to the problem which faced the Interstate
Commerce Commission during the first years of its operation. Judicial decisions
removed the right to fix maximum rates which had been assumed by the Commission
and left injunction as its only remedy. Without sanctions the Commission could not
deter shippers who made slight changes in their rates except by instituting a new
action and starting all over again. Amendments to the statute were required to restore
the power necessary for effective administration of the law. See LocKIrN, EcoNoMics
oF TRANSPORTATION 213-14 (5th ed. 1960); 1 WATKiNS, SHIPPERS AND CARIMERS
§§ 1-8 to -9 (5th ed. 1962).
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counsel to predict the outcome of such an evaluation might, in turn,
substantially decrease the number of actions for damages brought by
private parties 4 2 Even if a private plaintiff proved a violation of the law,
he might still be faced with the defendant's claim that prior law had been
43
unclear, and that there had been a good faith effort at compliance.
The court in the present case exercised that form of prospective overruling previously used in other areas of the law. Defendant's reliance on
a prior case holding is so clearly justified that it should not be held
liable. While the plaintiff has suffered injury for which damages would
have been granted under the court's new interpretation of the statute, this
consideration does not outweigh the defendant's reliance. However, where
prior law is uncertain, defendant would have relied on his own interpretation, albeit a reasonable one.44 In balancing such reliance against
plaintiff's proven injury, the equities of an hypothesized case fail to
resolve themselves clearly in favor of the defendant.
Liberalized prospective overruling thus does not provide a truly
satisfactory antidote to anomalies in the antitrust laws 4 5 If those laws
are unnecessarily vague and misleading, clarification should be sought
from Congress and the appropriate regulatory agencies.46

FEDERAL COURTS-LABOR LAW-REMOvAL

OF AND STATE
OVER ACTIONS SEEKING To ENJOnr
STRIKES IN VIOLATION OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS
COURT

JURISDICTION

Appellant employer sought an injunction in a state court against
respondent union's work-stoppage, alleging a breach of the no-strike
clause of their collective bargaining agreement. The union removed to
the federal district court. The district court denied appellant's motions for
remand,' holding that even though the Norris-La Guardia Act withdrew
2
from federal courts jurisdiction to issue injunctions in labor disputes,
42
Prospective overruling as ordinarily applied would not discourage a plaintiff
desiring to bring suit because he would seldom come before the court relying solely,
or even primarily, upon convincing it to overrule a previous case.
43It has been suggested that courts be given the discretion to award less than
treble damages where defendant has not willfully disregarded the antitrust laws.
ATr'y GEN. NAT'L CoMM. ANTITRUST REP. 378-79 (1955).
In such a case plaintiff
would stand to gain at least some compensation in any situation.
44
For the comparable treatment of changes affecting settled and unsettled law
in the administrative field, see 1 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREArISE § 5.09, at
350-52 (1958).
45 Cf. Note, 71 YALE L.J. 907, 944-47 (1962).
46 See, e.g., Keating, Myth, Reality, and the Future of Antitrust, 23 ABA, ANTI-

TRUST PROCEEDINGS 59

(1964).

1 American Dredging Co. v. Local 25, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 224 F.
Supp. 985 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
2 Norris-La Guardia Act § 4, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1958).
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the act did not deprive them of the original jurisdiction 3 requisite for
removal under section 1441(a) of the Judicial Code 4 As an alternative
ground of decision, the court said that, because it had power under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 54(c) 5 to grant money damages, it was not
prohibited by Norris-La Guardia from taking jurisdiction of the case.
On appeal from denial of a motion for preliminary injunction, the Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed on the grounds that the sort of
jurisdiction necessary for removal-the power to entertain a suit and
render a binding decision therein 6 -was withdrawn from the federal courts
in actions involving labor disputes by the Norris-La Guardia Act, and
that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were not designed to enlarge
the jurisdiction of the federal courts. American Dredging Co. v. Local 25,
Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 338 F.2d 837 (3d Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 380 U.S. 935 (1965).
Since 1887 7 the removal jurisdiction of the federal courts has extended only to cases "of which the district courts of the United States
have original jurisdiction." 8 Although the Norris-La Guardia Act is
phrased in terms of a withdrawal of jurisdiction,9 and although the
Supreme Court has held that section 301(a) of the Labor Management
Relations Act does not empower federal courts to enjoin strikes in violation of collective bargaining agreements,10 district courts have divided on
the question whether a suit for such an injunction may properly be
1
removed from a state court.'
The answer to the question would seem to depend on the meaning of
"jurisdiction" under the Norris-La Guardia Act. If the act withdraws
from the federal courts the same sort of general jurisdiction necessary
3 Jurisdiction over suits for violation of collective bargaining agreements is conferred on federal courts by Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act)
§301(a), 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1958).
4 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1958).
5 "Except as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by default, every
final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered
is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings." In the
instant case the appellant prayed for damages as well as an injunction. After removal,
it amended to seek only an injunction. 224 F. Supp. 985, 987-88 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
6Instant case at 842; cf. Minnesota v. Northern Sec. Corp., 194 U.S. 48, 63

(1904).
7 See HART & WEcISLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAl. SYSTEM 1019-20
(1953).
828 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1958).
0 "No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining
order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out
" Norris-La Guardia Act § 4, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29
of any labor dispute ....
U.S.C. §104 (1958).
10 Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962), 111 U. PA. L. Rv. 247.
11 Compare Merchants Refrigerating Co. v. Warehouse Union, 213 F. Supp. 177
(N.D. Cal. 1963) (remanding), with Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Council,
229 F. Supp. 123 (E.D. Pa. 1964) (allowing removal), and Tri-Boro Bagel Co. v.
Bakery Drivers Union, 228 F. Supp. 720 (E.D.N.Y. 1963) (same). The Supreme
Court has expressly reserved judgment on the issue. Charles Dowd Box Co. v.
Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 514 n.8 (1962).
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for removal under section 1441(a), injunction suits are nonremovable;
but if the act merely withdraws some lesser "equity jurisdiction" 12 or
power to issue injunctions, such suits are removable.'8 If analysis is
limited to such a purely technical construction of the statutory language,
the answer would seem to be that the act withdraws only equitable jurisdiction. Since federal courts may issue injunctions under the act when
certain strictly defined conditions are present,'14 they must have original
jurisdiction at least to inquire into the existence of those conditions. 15
A decision in favor of removability on this narrow ground, however,
would be exceedingly mole-eyed. First, it would effectively resolve,
without consideration of the merits, the crucial question of state court
power to enjoin strikes in breach of a collective bargaining agreement.
For if removal were permitted, a defendant could avoid an injunction
merely by transferring the cause to a federal court which, under Sinclair
Ref. Co. v. Atkinson,'6 would have to dismiss. Second, if state courts do
still have the power to enjoin such strikes, permitting removal would put
the removal statutes to a use for which they were never intended.
Although the legislative history of the Judicial Code provides no substantial insight into the congressional purpose in allowing removal of
suits involving federal questions, 17 removal was certainly not intended to
foreclose entirely remedies legitimately available in state courts. Thus,
if initial construction of the language of section 1441(a) seems to indicate
removability, inquiry should be extended to determine whether or not
state courts may enjoin strikes in breach of collective bargaining agreements.
12
CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEmS OF EQUITy 371 (1950) ; see id. at 367-74; cf. Venner
v. Great No. Ry., 209 U.S. 24, 33-35 (1908).
'3 The question of which sort of jurisdiction was withdrawn by the act has been
troublesome both to courts and to commentators. See, e.g., cases cited note 11 mipra;
Aaron, Strikes in Breach of Collective Agreements: Some Unanswered Questions,

63 COLUm. L. REv. 1027 (1963).
14 Norris-La Guardia Act § 7, 47 Stat. 71 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 107 (1958).
15 CHAFEE, op. cit. supra note 12 at 371-72; see United States v. UMW, 330 U.S.

258, 293-95 (1947) ; id. at 309-11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
16 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
17 The Judiciary Act of 1875, 18 Stat 470, which first conferred federal question
removal jurisdiction, originated in the House as an amendment to the former diversity
removal provisions for the purpose of allowing removal where diversity was not
complete. 2 CONG. REc. 4301 (1874). Both original and removal federal question
jurisdiction first appeared in the bill as amended by the Senate Judiciary Committee,
id. at 4978-79, which submitted no report.
It has been suggested that the purpose of original federal question jurisdiction
was to protect federally-created rights, see HART & WEcHSLER, op. cit. supra note 7,
at 727, or to secure more accurate interpretation of federal law, see Mishkin, The
Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 COLUm. L. REv. 157-59 (1953). Since
federal question removal jurisdiction was granted at the same time, it seems likely,
in the absence of contrary evidence, that its purposes were the same. Nonetheless,
neither of the foregoing theories satisfactorily explains removal jurisdiction. The
"accurate interpretation" theory apparently requires giving the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction, while under the protection theory, there is no reason to allow defendants to remove except on the basis of a federal defense. The original jurisdiction
requirement makes removal on the basis of a federal defense impossible. See Louisville & N.R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
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In Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney,1 8 the Supreme Court specifically rejected the contention that federal labor legislation had preempted
state court jurisdiction over suits for violation of collective bargaining
agreements.19 At the same term, however, the Court held that state
forums must apply federal rather than state law in such cases. 20 Consequently, the existence vel non of a state court's power to enjoin strikes
in violation of collective agreements is a question of federal law.
Although Congress probably has the power to prevent state courts
from enjoining peaceful strikes in breach of contract which affect interstate
commerce,2 1 it has not yet done so. The Norris-La Guardia Act itself
does not withdraw from state courts the power to enjoin such strikes.2 2
As Justice Traynor pointed out in the landmark case of McCarroll v. Los
23
"[T]he Norris-La Guardia
Angeles County Dist. Council of Carpenters,
Act is in terms drawn as a limitation on the courts of the United States." 2 4
More important, he observed that the act was based on the power of
Congress to restrict the jurisdiction of the federal courts 25 "and could not
constitutionally [apply to state courts] . . . since its prohibition was
not restricted to injunctions in labor disputes affecting interstate commerce
or any other subject over which Congress has paramount power." 26 The
language and legislative history of Norris-La Guardia, moreover, do not
reveal a congressional purpose 2 7 clear enough to justify application of the
18 368 U.S. 502 (1962).

19 Id. at 507. The state court apparently granted only a money judgment,
although the complaint sought an injunction as well. The doctrine of nonpreemption
has been extended, however, to allow individual employees to obtain an injunction
against both their employer and their union. Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335
(1964).
2
0 Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962). The law to be
applied includes the common law of labor agreements which Textile Workers Union
v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 95 (1962), directed federal courts to fashion. See Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co., supra at 103.
In the instant decision the court held that, since the complaint did not invoke
section 301(a), the case was not one arising under the laws of the United States.
Instant case at 846. Such a formalistic approach seems to conflict with Lucas Flour's
holding that federal law governs "issues raised in suits of a kind covered by § 301
." Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co., supra at 103. (Emphasis added.)
21 See Aaron, supra note 13, at 1035. But see McCarroll v. Los Angeles County
Dist. Council of Carpenters, 49 Cal. 2d 45, 61-62, 315 P.2d 322, 331 (1957), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958).
22 See Note, 72 HARv. L. REv. 354, 366-67 (1958).
2349 Cal. 2d 45, 315 P.2d 322 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958), 106
U. PA. L. REV. 1070.
2
4Id. at 63, 315 P.2d at 332; see Norris-La Guardia Act § 13(d), 47 Stat 73
(1932), 29 U.S.C. § 113(d) (1958) : "The term 'court of the United States' means
any court of the United States whose jurisdiction has been or may be conferred or
defined or limited by Act of Congress ....
25H.R. REP. No. 669, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1932); see Wilson & Co. v.
United Packinghouse Workers, 83 F. Supp. 162, 165 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
26 49 Cal. 2d at 63, 315 P.2d at 332.
27

See notes 40-43 infra and accompanying text.
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act to situations not covered by the terms of the statute.2 8 Thus judicial
denial of state court power to enjoin breaches of no-strike clauses would
have to rest not upon the Norris-La Guardia Act, but upon the federal
common law of collective agreements.2 9
No decision under this common law has yet withdrawn state court
power to enjoin strikes in violation of contract. Judge Hastie, dissenting
in the present case, said that Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson 30 required that
result. He maintained that "the Court decided that section 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act and section 4 of the Norris-La Guardia
Act, considered together, require the conclusion that federal labor law
does not permit such an injunction." 31 But his argument rests on a
misapprehension of the Sinclair case itself. For Sinclair was originally
brought in a federal court; its precise holding was that a federal court
could not enjoin a strike in breach of a collective agreement. Furthermore, the Sinclair Court's reasoning does not justify an assertion that the
Court there declared a general federal anti-injunction policy applicable to
the states under Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co. 32 After finding
that a strike in breach of contract is a labor dispute within NorrisLa Guardia,3 the Court proceeded to analyze the effect of the enactment
of section 301 on the continued vitality of that act. 4 Noting that Congress
had considered and rejected proposals to lift the ban on federal court
injunctions in section 301 cases,3 5 the Court concluded that there had
been no intent to repeal that prohibition by implication. It did not make
the positive determination that a new general anti-injunction policy
existed; it made the negative determination that section 301 did not alter
the old, limited anti-injunction policy of Norris-La Guardia.3 6 Thus
federal policy concerning injunctions against strikes in breach of contract
was unchanged by Sinclair, and the case may not legitimately be used in
conjunction with Lucas Flour to withdraw such jurisdiction from state
courts.

There remains the possibility that the Supreme Court may discover in
existing labor legislation a general anti-injunction policy applicable to the
states. An indication of the existence of such a policy is suggested by one
28 See the discussion in MISHKIN & MORRIS, ON LAW IN CouRTs 335-52 (1965)
of the repudiation by the Supreme Court in Markham v. Cabell, 326 U.S. 404 (1945),
of the language of § 9(a) of the Trading With the Enemy Act. The authors conclude
that a court may go beyond the bounds of statutory language, but only when firmly
convinced of the legislative purpose.
29 See Aaron, supra note 13, at 1039.
80370 U.S. 195 (1962), 111 U. PA. L. REv. 247.
31 Instant case at 857.
32 369 U.S. 95 (1962).

83 370 U.S. at 199.
84 Id. at

203-14.

35 Id. at 205-08.
36 Cf. Shaw Elec. Co. v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 418 Pa. 1, 7-9,

208 A.2d 769, 772-74 (1965).
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commentator who maintains that the Norris-La Guardia Act was in
actuality based upon Congress's substantive judgment that labor injunctions should be prohibited generally, and that the act was limited to federal
courts only because Congress doubted whether the commerce power was
broad enough to encompass labor legislation. 37 It seems quite possible,
however, that political considerations as well as constitutional fears played
an important role in the limitation of the act to the federal courts. 38
Another commentator, writing at the time of Norris-La Guardia's enactment, suggested that the chances for success of a more radical bill were
at best slim.39 Such political considerations may well explain the limitation of congressional discussion to the abuses by federal judges 40 and the
emphasis during debate on the nonapplicability of the act to the state
courts.4 1

It is impossible to tell how many votes were the result of such

assurances of limitation. 42 It would seem illegitimate for a court to accept
as a basis for common-law development a policy which, although desired
by the proponents of the bill, was considered by them too weak to survive
the political process and which, even if an accurate reflection of the mood
of Congress, 43 never found expression in law.44
37

Aaron, supra note 13, at 1034-39, 1033 n.51.

38 See Witte, The Federal Anti-Injunction Act, 16 MiNN. L. Rxv. 638, 648-49

(1932).

39 "While the overwhelming majority by which the Norris-La Guardia bill was
finally passed may be considered evidence that a much more radical bill would have
also received congressional sanction, this seems very doubtful even now to all who

have been in close touch with the situation." Id. at 649.
40 75 CONG. REc. 4502-11, 4618-30, 5462-5511 (1932).
41
E.g., id. at 5462 (remarks of Representative O'Connor)

("It of course has no

application to or control over State courts") ; id. at 5464 (remarks of Representative
Michener) (state courts are "at liberty to issue any type of an injunction which is
permitted in the State where the court has jurisdiction"); id. at 5478 (remarks of
Representative La Guardia) ("The bill does not take one iota of jurisdiction-because we have not the power-from the State courts and does not change any State
law").
42
Concern was also voiced over the declining respect for the federal courts and
the federal government as a whole. E.g., 75 CONG. RIc. 4624 (1932) (remarks of
Senator Blaine) : "[I]s it any wonder that the judiciary is losing its standing among
men and women? Is there anyone who believes that these acts do not reflect most
seriously upon the judiciary, not only the single judge alone, but the whole judicial
system of the United States ?"
43
The tenor of the debates tends to suggest dissatisfaction with injunctions in
general, even though discussion was usually framed in terms of the federal courts.
44
Although the Supreme Court in Hutcheson v. United States, 312 U.S. 219
(1941), read the Norris-La Guardia Act as having an effect broader than its literal
language-to legalize as against federal criminal prosecution activity which federal
courts are forbidden by the act to enjoin-the case is not authority for an extension
of the act's application to state courts. First, strikes in violation of a collective
agreement are not lawful: § 301 made clear that such strikes are actionable even
though, under Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962), the remedy available in the federal courts may be limited to damages. Second, the Clayton Act's
language specifically legalizing certain labor conduct, as well as the legislative history
of the Norris-La Guardia Act which indicated Congress's dissatisfaction with past
judicial interpretation of that language, provided the Court with sufficient certainty
of legislative purpose to enable it legitimately to go beyond the statutory language
in that case. See United States v. Hutcheson, supra at 229-34; MISHKIN & MoRais,
op. cit. supra note 28, at 335-52. There is no such strong indication of legislative
intent to extend Norris-La Guardia's application to state courts.
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In fact certain aspects of federal labor policy indicate that state court
injunctions should be allowed. First, as the McCarroll case 45 pointed
out, section 301 was designed to enhance the enforceability of labor contracts,46 and "we would give altogether too ironic a twist to this purpose
if we held that the actual effect of the legislation was to abolish in state
courts equitable remedies that had been available, and leave an employer
in a worse position in respect to the effective enforcement of his contract
than he was before the enactment of section 301." 47 In addition federal
policy denies protection to strikes in breach of contract. Both the NLRB
and the courts 48 have held that discharge of such strikers is not an unfair
labor practice since the activity is unprotected by section 7 of the National
Labor Relations Act.49 Thus, even though Congress's failure to repeal
Norris-La Guardia in section 301 situations has left that act as an obstacle
in the path of federal courts, 50 it would be undesirable to strain 51 to place
the same roadblock before state courts as well and thus to withdraw an
effective remedy against activity upon which federal policy frowns.
The foregoing analysis is concededly not unassailable. Indeed, affirmance of state court power to enjoin strikes in violation of contract seems
little more reasonable than its denial. As pointed out by Mr. Justice
Brennan, dissenting in Sinclair, to vest state courts with such power would
in practice make them the primary creators of the new federal common labor
law. 52 Furthermore, since injunctive relief in the labor context affects
substantial interests of the parties, there is an argument, based on Lucas
Flour, that the availability of the remedy should be uniform in the federal
and state courts.53 Finally, since actions for breach of contract tend to
45
McCarroll v. Los Angeles County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 49 Cal. 2d
45, 315 P.2d 322 (1957).
46Id. at 63, 315 P.2d at 332; accord, Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S.
195, 226 (1962) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney,
368 U.S. 502, 509-13 (1962).
47 49 Cal. 2d at 63-64, 315 P.2d at 332.
4
8E.g., NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332 (1939); Southwest Banana
Distribs., Inc., 145 N.L.R.B. 815 (1964); Budd Electronics, Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 498,
501 (1962) ; see NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 17 (1962) (dictum).
4949 Stat 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1958).
50 Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
51 The proposition that § 301 really directed federal courts to fashion a common law of labor agreements was strongly opposed by Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
dissenting in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 460-84 (1957),
and by commentators, e.g., Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial
Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1957). Disagreement with
the decision in Sinclair has been strong as well. See Aaron, supra note 13, at 1034-35;
47 MINN. L. REv. 643 (1963); 111 U. PA. L. REv. 247 (1962); 1963 Wis. L. REv.
626, 629-35. It seems fair to say that reading these two oft-questioned Supreme Court
enunciations of unenunciated congressional policy in such a way as to reach a furtherremoved unenunciated position would be a strain.
52 Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 226 (1962). Nonetheless, under
Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962), state courts will continue
to fashion federal law, whether or not they may grant injunctions.
53 See Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962) ; Aaron, supra
note 13, at 1035-36. On account of possible state court misinterpretation of the substantive law, it might be thought particularly desirable to have federal courts decide
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arise from disputes which arguably involve unfair labor practices, 54 it
might be legitimate to prohibit state court injunctions against them 55
merely as a prophylactic measure to protect the jurisdiction of the NLRB. 56
The better view, however, is that, in the absence of a strongly enunciated federal policy, traditional state court equity powers 57 should not
be invaded by extending the Lincoln Mills 58 and Sinclair5 9 doctrines if
the only objects of that extension are to increase the percentage of section
301 cases decided by federal courts, or to achieve uniformity of remedy
where uniformity of governing substantive law already exists,60 or to
protect the NLRB's jurisdiction in an area where the Supreme Court
has previously refused to apply the preemption doctrine. 61
Since removal would thus defeat legitimate exercise of state court
power, and constitute an improper use of the removal statute, 2 suits to
enjoin strikes in violation of collective bargaining agreements should be
held nonremovable.3
cases involving implied no-strike clauses. Such concern is of slight significance,
however, since most cases involve express clauses. In any case Lucas Flour's test
for an implied clause can be applied easily by state courts and does not present the
need for close federal supervision. See Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co., .supra
at 105-06 (agreement must expressly provide for settlement exclusively and finally
by compulsory arbitration).
54 See Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
55As a matter of convenience for the courts, it would not seem practicable to
apply the doctrine only in cases where there is a possibility of the existence of an
unfair labor practice.
66 Such a theory should properly be based on the preemption doctrine. See San
The difficulty is
Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
that the Supreme Court has repeatedly refused to apply preemption in the § 301
area. Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U.S. 238, 245 n.5 (1962) ; Teamsters Union
v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 101 n.9 (1962) ; Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney,
368 U.S. 502 (1962). Those cases could perhaps be distinguished as involving money
damages only. However, the preemption doctrine is delimited by the nature of the
activities regulated rather than by the method of regulation. San Diego Bldg. Trades
Council v. Gannon, stpra at 243. "Such regulation can be as effectively exerted
through an award of damages as through some form of preventive relief." Id. at 247.
Nevertheless such an argument might appeal to the Supreme Court, which, in recent
labor cases, appears to have developed a greater antipathy toward injunctions than
toward damage awards. See SHAPiRo, LAW AND POLmCS IN THE SUPRnME COURT
126-30 (1964).
See generally id. at 75-142.
57
1t is likely that the Pennsylvania courts would grant an injunction in the
instant case. See Shaw Elec. Co. v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 418 Pa. 1,
208 A.2d 769 (1965) ; Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass'n v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 382 Pa. 326, 115 A2d 733, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 843 (1955).
58
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) (federal courts
must fashion common law of labor agreements).
59 Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962) (federal courts may not
issue injunctions in § 301 cases).
60 See HART & WECHSLER, op. cit. supra note 7, at 436.
61 See note 56 supra.
62 See text accompanying note 17 mpra.
63This conclusion is in accord with the doctrine that removal statutes should
be strictly construed, cf. Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100 (1941),
with all doubts to be resolved against removal. See, e.g., Albi v. Street & Smith
Publications, Inc., 140 F.2d 310, 312 (9th Cir. 1944) ; Glucksman v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 219 F. Supp. 767 (S.D. Cal. 1963); Patriot-News Co. v. Harrisburg Printing Pressmen, 191 F. Supp. 568 (M.D. Pa. 1961).
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LABOR LAW-STATE COuRT AssEiTs

JURSDICTION To GRAxT
DAMAGES iN LIBEL AcTION ARISING OUT Op DEFAMATORY STATE-

MENTS MADE BY ONE UNION AGAINST ANOTHER'S LEADms DURING
A LABoR DISPUTE
During a preelection campaign between two unions, each seeking to
represent employees of a transport company, defendant union published a
newspaper charging plaintiffs, opposing union leaders, with the commission of burglary, robbery, unlawful possession of drugs, rape, sodomy,
and manslaughter.: After plaintiffs' union lost the election, it filed objections with the NLRB alleging, inter alia, that the newspaper constituted a
libel which prevented the employees' free choice in the election. Although
the election was set aside on other grounds, the Board held that "this
objection should be overruled since the allegations involved were not within
the special knowledge of the defendants, and plaintiffs' union had ample
opportunity to correct the alleged distortions and misrepresentations." 2
The plaintiffs then sued defendant union and seven individuals connected
with the newspaper publication in a state court, alleging that the statements were published "with willful and malicious intent to injure plaintiffs
.
. " 3 On appeal from the lower court's denial of defendants' motion
challenging state court jurisdiction, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
found a compelling state interest in the interrelationship between libel and
violence, 4 held that there was no conflict with national labor policy, and
therefore affirmed the ruling of the lower court that preemption under
the National Labor Relations Act did not preclude state court jurisdiction.
Meyer v. Joint Council 53, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 416 Pa. 401, 206 A.2d
382, cert. filed, 33 U.S.L. WEEK 3362 (U.S. April 30, 1965) (No. 1115).
In passing the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, 5 Congress enacted a statutory
scheme regulating many aspects of labor-management relations. In order
to prevent state-law frustration of the policies underlying and arising
out of 6 these limited provisions, courts have interpreted the act as pre, Instant case at 402(a)-(b), 206 A.2d at 391-94 (appendix).
2 Id. at 403-04 n.2, 206 A.2d 383-84 n.2.
Id. at 404, 206 A.2d at 383.
4 While the opinion of the supreme court did not state that any violence occurred
during the preelection campaign, the Regional Director's Report, see Report and
Recommendations on Objections to Election in the Matter of Motor Transport Labor
Relations, Inc., No. 4-RC-5059 (1964), later adopted by the NLRB, see Supplemental
Decision, Order and Direction of Second Election in the Matter of Motor Transport
Labor Relations, Inc., No. 4-RC-5059 (1964), contained evidence of violence during
the preelection period. However, the supreme court based the decision on its belief
that libel provokes violence; thus, the actual existence of violent conduct is irrelevant.
Since there was no evidence that the libel in question caused any of the violence
which occurred, this comment will assume that the present facts arose in a nonviolent preelection campaign.
5 Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-88
(1958).
6 For purposes of this comment, a distinction is made between that policy which
motivated Congress to enact national labor legislation in general, or a specific section
in particular, and that policy which courts have found necessary to protect congressional intention from intrusion of state concerns.
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empting from state regulation a field wider than the provisions themselves. 7
Therefore, when a labor dispute is connected with a set of facts on which
redress is sought under state law, it is necessary to consider preemption
8
in light of whether the statutory language itself has dealt with the activity,
as well as whether the applicable state law is in conflict with the policy
of the act.9
The current standard for determining whether the language of the
act itself constitutes preemption was enunciated in San Diego Bldg. Trades
Council v. Garrnon:10 "When an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or
§ 8 of the Act, the States as well as the federal courts must defer to the
exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board if the danger
of state interference with national policy is to be averted." 11 The Court
noted that preemption under this rule is limited by a state's right to regulate activities involving violence or areas of only peripheral concern to
the act.-2
When activities are not preempted under the Garmon rule, courts
have resorted to a case-by-case method to determine whether the policy of
the act requires that such unprotected-unprohibited activity nevertheless
V 3
remain unregulated.
Although this method has produced no adequate
standard, the cases seem to indicate the following considerations to be
relevant: (1) the NLRB's treatment of the activity in question; 14 (2)
the relation of this activity to the provisions of the act and to congressional
intention concerning them;' 5 (3) the adaptability of state law to the
policy of the particular section involved; 16 and (4) ability of a state court
to define accurately potential conflict without resorting to impractical
distinctions.
7 See generally BERNSTEIN, THE NEw DEAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING POLICY
1-17, 57-99, 129-49 (1950).
8
See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
9 See Local 20, Teamsters Union v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252 (1964).
The uniformity required to realize the congressional intention of providing national
regulation to replace state policies tending to impede national commerce, necessitates
more than minimal standards of state regulation. Rather Congress' purpose can only
be achieved by an exclusive system of national regulation which prevents state interference. See Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Congress, and State Jurisdiction Over
Labor Relations, 59 COLUm. L. REv. 6, 21 (1959) ; cf. Cooley v. Board of Wardens,
53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319 (1851).
10 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
21 Id. at 245. This test was alternatively stated as preempting those activities
-which are "protected by § 7 or prohibited by § 8," or which are "governed" by these
sections. Id. at 244.
12 See id. at 243, 247; Ratner, New Developments in Federal-State Jurisdiction,

15 N.Y.U.

CONFERENCE ON LABOR

47 (1962).

13 See, e.g., International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958);
International Union, UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245

(1949).
14 See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959);
Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468 (1955).
15 See De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144 (1960) (state statute).
1D See Hill v. Florida ex rel. Watson, 325 U.S. 538 (1945) (state statute).
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In applying the Garmon rule it is helpful to look at the problem of
the NLRB's primary jurisdiction to facilitate resolution of whether the
activity is subject to sections 7 or 8 of the act.-7 On facts similar to those
in the present case, the Board has treated libel under the following
standard:
The Board normally will not censor or police preelection
propaganda by parties to elections, absent threats or acts of
violence.

However . . . the Board has imposed some limits

on campaign tactics. Exaggerations, inaccuracies, partial truths,
name-calling, and falsehoods, while not condoned, may be excused as legitimate propaganda, provided they are not so misleading as to prevent the exercise of a free choice by employees in
8
the election of the bargaining representative.'
Only when there has been no opportunity to rebut misleading statements
is free choice precluded and the election set aside.'2
Thus the Board's
use of libel is evidentiary; it is limited to the specific question of whether
or not the particular speech, like coercive third party activity,20 has so
contaminated the atmosphere surrounding the campaign that free exercise
of employee section 7 rights is impaired. The Board gives an individual
no remedy for loss of reputation. Rather, the act is concerned only when
loss of reputation affects section 7 rights, and even then, the Board's
remedy is restricted to vindication of interference with these rights, not
to redress for the actual loss.
If libelous speech can be used to set aside an election in order to
protect section 7 rights, it can hardly be argued that section 7 protects
libel. 2 ' In addition section 8(C),22 a limitation on the Board's use of
'7 See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959);
Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468 (1955).
18 Gummed Prods. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1092, 1093-94 (1955); accord, Comfort
Slipper Corp., 112 N.L.R.B. 183, 184 (1954); Merck & Co., 104 N.L.R.B. 891, 894
(1952).
19 See generally Fuchs, Pre-election Campaign Propagandaand Activities Before
the National Labor Relations Board, 4 BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL & COMMERCIAL
L. REv. 485, 509-16 (1963).
20 Third party conduct, while not covered by the National Labor Relations Act,
can cause an election to be set aside because of its effect on the atmosphere in which
the election is held. James Lees & Sons, 130 N.L.R.B. 290 (1961).
The standards applied to third party activity are similar to those used for libel-the absence
of an opportunity to rebut by the injured party in the election campaign invalidates
the election.
21 Court interpretation of § 8(c) supports this view. See International Bhd. of
Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 181 F.2d 34, 38-39 (2d Cir. 1950), aff'd, 341 U.S. 694
(1951); cf. Patterson-Sargent Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 1627 (1956).
See also NLRB v.
Local 1229, Intl Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 346 U.S. 464 (1953) ; Salzhandler v. Caputo,
316 F.2d 445, 451 (2d Cir.) (dictum), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 946 (1963).
2 61 Stat. 142 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1958): "The expressing
of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof, whether in written,
printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor
practice under any of the provisions of this subchapter, if such expression contains
no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit."
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libelous speech, m expressly precludes using libel either as the basis for
or as evidence of an unfair labor practice. Thus section 8(c) does not
prohibit libel. But since libel can be used as evidence on which an election
is set aside, section 8(c) does not protect libel, but merely restricts its
evidentiary use. Libel therefore falls within the unprotected-unprohibited
area and is not preempted from state court jurisdiction by the Garmon
rule.
If the Garinon rule fails to preempt libel, it is necessary to determine
whether the overall policy of the act, and specifically the policy of section
8(c), protects libelous speech from state regulation. One type of
unprotected-unprohibited activity has been held preempted in the recent
Supreme Court decision, Local 20, Teamsters Union v. Morton,s 4 which
involved secondary activity which formed part of a union's strike against
the employer's plant. The federal district court granted damages under
section 303 of the act,2 5 which prohibits certain secondary activity, and
under state law for that conduct which was not covered by section 303.
The Supreme Court, reversing as to the award of damages for conduct
neither protected nor prohibited by the act, held that the plaintiff was
restricted to his section 303 remedy. Finding that, in enacting this section,
the field had been occupied and closed to state regulation, the Court stated:
Congress [had] struck the "balance . . . between the uncontrolled power of management and labor to further their respective interests" . . . by "preserving the right of labor organizations to bring pressure to bear on offending employers in
primary disputes and [by] shielding unoffending employers and
others from pressures in controversies not their own.2
The Morton holding is not inconsistent with a view that not all
libelous statements are preempted, for section 303 merely shows a congressional purpose to place strictly defined limits on regulation of secondary
activity and to prevent state law from redefining what activity is secondary
or from narrowing the scope of permissible conduct in the secondary area.
For the holding of Morton to preclude state court jurisdiction over
libelous statements, a similar finding of congressional intention in enacting
section 8(c) would be necessary. In addition to the statutory language
and the Board's interpretation of this language, section 8(c) preemption
must look to two policy factors-the policy Congress acted upon in
passing the provision and the policy which court interpretation would
23

See cases cited note 18 mspra.

U.S. 252 (1964).
261 Stat. 158 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 187 (Supp. V, 1964).
20
Local 20, Teamsters Union v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252, 259 (1964) (quoting
Local 1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93, 100 (1958), and NLRB
2377

v. Denver Bldg. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 692 (1951)).
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subsequently find to be part of it. The latter policy seems concerned
with the ability of courts to determine adequately on the facts before
them whether a decision applying state law would at any time conflict
with the congressional purpose underlying the act, or present a situation
necessitating such fine distinctions that subsequent courts could not properly perceive the area preempted. Moreover, this policy involves consideration not only of the statutory language and congressional purpose
behind the language, but also of overall labor policy and the relationship
between various sections of the act and the particular section at issue.
To hold state court jurisdiction preempted in defamation cases arising
from labor disputes would be tantamount to finding that Congress intended to delimit libel in such a way that free choice in representation
elections was the only interest protected. But freedom of discussion,
considered apart from labor relations, does not encompass the right to use
libelous speech.27 The extent to which speech, libelous outside the labor
context, is not libelous when a part of labor discussion must therefore
depend on a close examination of the congressional definition of free
speech in section 8(c). Such an examination reveals that the stated
object of section 8(c) was to give both employers and employees freedom
to express their views on labor matters without such expression becoming
evidence of an unfair labor practice,28 but that no damage remedy was
provided for libel occurring in labor disputes. Thus, if that free speech
protected by section 8(c) included libel generally, it would differ significantly from the free speech protected by the first amendment.29 For the
first amendment's failure to protect libel may constitute a negative right of
reputation enforceable by state law damage actions. Thus any intention
to destroy that right should not be lightly read into section 8(c).
In applying the preemption doctrine to libelous statements made
during a labor dispute, courts have produced varying results. Some courts
hold that libelous statements are arguably subject to sections 7 and 8 and
therefore cannot be the basis of a damage action in a state or federal court.30
One court has sustained state court jurisdiction by stating that libel is
arguably subject to sections 7 and 8, but comes within the violence exception.3 ' A third approach sustains state jurisdiction by simply finding
that state interest in redressing libel is so significant as to be "unpre2

7See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) ; Beauharnais
v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1951).
2
8BNA NEw LABOR LAw 1947, at 45.
This section was intended primarily as
protection for employers who were afraid that the expression of opinion would later
be used to evince a motive requisite to the finding of an unfair labor practice. See
id. at E(3)-54-55 (remarks of Senators Morse, Pepper, and Taft).
29See cases cited note 27 supra.
S0 See, e.g., Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of America, 337 F.2d 68 (6th
Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 33 U.S.L. WE=n 3247 (U.S. Jan. 9, 1965) (No. 819);
Hill v. Moe, 367 P.2d 739 (Alaska 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 916 (1962) ; Blum
v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 42 NJ. 389, 201 A.2d 46 (1964), 65 CoLuM.

L. REv. 345 (1965).

3' Instant case at 407 & 408-09 n.11, 206 A.2d at 385 & 385-86 n.11.
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emptable." 32 These approaches all oversimplify the problem by presupposing that all libel is either preempted or open to state regulation.
They fail to examine adequately the relationship between allegedly libelous
statements and the policy of section 8(c).
Section 8(c) probably does require that some statements, libelous
under state law, be treated as legitimate discussion for labor purposes.
However, a differentiation can be made between that speech which should
have no libel remedy under state law and that which does. Statements
such as those which were held preempted in Blum v. InternationalAss'n
of Machinists3 3 could be considered as part of the appropriate give-andtake of labor-management bargaining." For in that case the alleged libel
would have had little effect outside the dispute involved, and, rather than
being a malicious and untruthful attack on an individual's reputation, was
an expression of opinion on company officials' attitude designed to present
the union's viewpoint. On the other hand, the statements made in the
present case maliciously and groundlessly attacked the personal reputations
of the opposing union's leaders. It could not be said that the statements
were a legitimate discussion of labor matters 3 5 Admittedly, the moral
character of union leaders is a proper matter for discussion, since it
affects their fitness to serve, especially where the honesty of an individual
is involved. But such charges can successfully be distinguished from a
baseless and broadscale smear of personal reputation. The necessary
distinction may be made by first determining whether or not the words,
viewed without regard to malice, are couched in traditional or statutory
labor terminology, or if the language used was appropriately related to
the substantive issues making up the dispute. Second, union leaders, as
well as employers, should be treated as public officials 36 for libel purposes
under the constitutionally required standard enunciated by the Supreme
Court 7 The public official test not only requires that the libel be malicious, but also probably means that only fact, as distinguished from opinion,
may be actionable under state law3 8 Utilization of these rules will make
application of state libel law to statements arising during a labor dispute
32See Brantly v. Devereaux, 237 F. Supp. 156 (E.D.S.C. 1965); California
Dump Truck Owners Ass'n v. Joint Council of Teamsters, 45 CCH Lab. Cas. 50546
(Cal. Super. Ct. 1962) ; cf. Salzhandler v. Caputo, 316 F.2d 445, 451 (2d Cir.) (dictum), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 946 (1963).
s3 42 NJ. 389, 201 A2d 46 (1964).
34The union in its organizational campaign, stated that the plant manager of
the employer was trying to defeat this effort. The alleged libel consisted of statements
which compared Blum's, the plant manager's, antiunion tactics to the strong-arm
methods used by the "Nazis" and "Russians." These comparisons were used to show
that the plant manager was using fear, bribery, and coercion to prevent the exercise
of employee rights guaranteed by the act. Id. at 392-93, 201 A.2d at 47-48.
35See BNA NEW LABOR LAW 1947, at 45.
36 See instant case at 413, 206 A.2d at 388; Nichols v. Oklahoma City Mailer's
Union, 285 P.2d 399 (Okla. 1955).
37See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), 113 U. PA. L. REV.
284; Clark v. Allen, 415 Pa. 484, 204 A.2d 42 (1964).
38 See ibid.
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accord with the policies of 8(c). Prior restraint on labor discussion will
be avoided, since that discussion which is legitimately within the policy
of the act will still be preempted, and harassment by subsequent suits will
be precluded by a sufficiently clear standard.
Preemption of plaintiffs' right of redress in the present case is probably,
in the last analysis, inimical to the fundamental policies underlying the
National Labor Relations Act. It is difficult to see how respectable men
can be enlisted to lead the labor movement if their reputations are completely
laid open to totally uninhibited defamation, whose impact must inevitably
extend beyond the labor dispute to the community at large.39

PATENTS-KNoWING Suppia

OF REPLAcEMENT FOR MATERIAL

PART OF PATENTED COMBINATION Is CONTRIBUTORY INFRINGER BUT
MAY BE LIA.BLE ONLY FOR NomiNAL DAMAGES

Respondent Convertible Top Replacement Company (CTR) was
assignee of a combination patent on a convertible automobile top which
consisted of a framework, a fabric cover, and a mechanism to seal the
fabric against the side of the car. Petitioner Aro Manufacturing Company
(Aro) sold fabric replacements. Both General Motors and Ford convertible cars made during 1952-1954 included the patented combination.
General Motors was licensed to make and sell the combination; Ford was
not. In 1955 Ford made an agreement with the original patentee whereby
Ford and its customers were released from liability for past infringement
and granted a license to make, use, and sell the combination in the future.
In a previous ruling I the Supreme Court held that replacing the wornout top fabric was "repair," not "reconstruction." This holding meant
that authorized users of the combination, such as General Motors car
purchasers, were free to buy a replacement from whomever they wished,
and that anyone was free to sell to them. In the present case the Supreme
Court held that Aro was a contributory infringer for sales to Ford owners
from the time Aro knew Ford held no license to manufacture and sell
until the date of the agreement between the original patentee and Ford,
because during that time each car owner was a direct infringer, 2 and
39 Cf. Post Publishing Co. v. Hallam, 59 Fed. 530, 540-41 (6th Cir. 1893).
1Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336 (1961)
(Aro I).
2 35 U.S.C. § 271 (a) (1958): "[W]hoever without authority makes, uses or sells
any patented invention, within the United States during the term of the patent therefor,
infringes the patent."
Justices Harlan, Brennan, Stewart, White, and Goldberg held that Ford purchasers infringed even though they did not know that they bought cars with infringing
tops. Instant case at 482-84. This holding is in accord with established doctrine.
See, e.g., Duplate Corp. v. Triplex Safety Glass Co., 298 U.S. 448 (1936); Wine
Ry. Appliance Co. v. Enterprise Ry. Equip. Co., 297 U.S. 387 (1936); Birdsell v.
Shaliol, 112 U.S. 485 (1884); United States v. Berdan Fire-Arms Mfg. Co., 156
U.S. 552, 566 (1895) (dictum).
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Aro repaired the tops with full knowledge that its customer was an
infringer 3 After concluding with Mr. Justice Harlan that Aro was a
contributory infringer, Mr. Justice Brennan, writing for himself and Justices
Goldberg, White, and Stewart, went on to consider the question of the
measure of recovery. 4 He concluded that Aro was likely to be liable
only for nominal damages, because CTR probably received full compensation
through the settlement with Ford for the unauthorized use of its patented
invention. Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S.
476 (1964) (Aro 11).
In deciding the damages issue justice Brennan began with the
proposition that the measure of recovery, as defined by section 284 of the
Patent Code,5 is limited to damages suffered by the patentee and does
not include profits made by the infringer. CTR's damages are the amount
it would have made if Aro had not been an infringer; in other words the
amount it would have made if Ford, Ford's customers, and Aro had
acted legally. Had they acted legally, Ford would have paid CTR for a
license to manufacture and sell the patented articles. The amount Ford
would have paid is the measure of CTR's recovery. Justice Brennan assumed, although he said that CTR could disprove the assumption on
835 U.S.C. §271(c) (1958):
Whoever sells a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination or composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a
patented process, constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the
same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement
of such patent, and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable
for substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer.
Justices Black, Douglas, Clark, and White and Mr. Chief Justice Warren held
that Aro was a contributory infringer only for that time during which it knew the
top for which the replacement fabric was especially designed was both patented and
infringing. Instant case at 488 n.8, 514, 524-27. This holding requires a higher
degree of knowledge than was required by common law prior to the enactment of
§ 271(c) in 1952. Formerly it was not necessary for a patentee, in order to state a
cause of action, to allege that the supplier of an essential part had actual knowledge
that the combination in which the part was to be used infringed the patent. Mercoid
Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 664 (1944); Thomson-Houston Elec.
Co. v. Ohio Brass Co., 80 Fed. 712 (6th Cir. 1897); Wallace v. Holmes, 29 Fed.
Cas. 74 (No. 17100) (C.C.D. Conn. 1871). A court of appeals decision rendered
after the passage of § 271(c) follows the view of these cases. Freedman v. Friedman,
242 F.2d 364 (4th Cir. 1957). Contra, Buxton, Inc. v. Julien, Inc., 223 F. Supp. 697,
701 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (dictum).
That both majority and minority were able to find support in legislative history
for their views on this issue, instant case at 488 & n.8, 524-27, is an indication of the
vagueness of legislative intent in this area.
4 Instant case at 502-13. The issue was not argued before the Court, and Mr.
Justice Harlan considered it not ready for decision.
5 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1958) :
Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than
a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer,
together with interest and costs as fixed by the court.
When the damages are not found by a jury, the court shall assess them.
In either event the court may increase the damages up to three times the
amount found or assessed.
The court may receive expert testimony as an aid to the determination
of damages or of what royalty would be reasonable under the circumstances.
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remand, that the price paid by Ford for the release, even though it specifically stated an intention not to release or license contributory infringers,
was the amount CTR would have received to license Ford at the outset.6
If the presumption is not disproved on remand, CTR can recover only
7
nominal damages.
In further support of his position that Aro's sales did not damage
CTR, Justice Brennan argued that, even if it had made no agreement
with Ford, CTR could not have licensed Aro, because "the right [to
license contributory infringers] could not be granted without allowing the
patentee to 'derive its profit, not from the invention on which the law
gives it a monopoly, but from the unpatented supplies with which it is
used .

.

.

.'

He also said that "it would be absurd to say that what

CTR could not recover from Aro in Aro I after it had licensed General
Motors, it could recover here if it had stood by and let Ford infringe-as it apparently did . . .- and had then brought suit against Aro before
settling with Ford." 9
Although the theory that CTR's damages were limited to the value
it would have received from Ford for a license was propounded by a
minority of the Court, it may represent the majority view. Mr. Justice
Black's dissenting opinion, representing the views of himself, Mr. Chief
Justice Warren, Mr. Justice Douglas, and Mr. Justice Clark, recognized
that "the Court holds, quite properly .

.

.,

that a patentee can get only

one recovery for one infringement, no matter how many different persons
take part in the infringement." 10
The suggestion by Justice Brennan that CTR could not have licensed
or sued Aro, even if it had not granted Ford a release from liability, because
to allow it to do so would give it a monopoly over unpatented supplies
ignores section 271(d) of the patent provisions:
No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement
or contributory infringement shall be denied relief or deemed
guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by reason
6 CTR, of course, has the burden of proving that it has not yet received a "reasonable royalty" for the infringing use made of the invention.
7The lower court may be presented with a problem if CTR brings forward evidence that Ford would have paid more for a license than the price of the release,
because Justice Brennan tentatively suggested that, had CTR not been able to recover
at all from Ford or Ford purchasers, it could recover full damages from Aro. Id.

at 508. The Justice seemed to assume that CTR would have received the same from
Ford for a royalty as it did from General Motors. See id. at 509 n.22. Apparently,
then, evidence that General Motors paid more for its royalty than Ford did for its
release would be affirmative evidence that a "reasonable royalty" had not yet been
received.

However, even if such unlikely proof were forthcoming, Aro should not

be held liable for the simple difference in sums, because the only contribution it made
went toward prolonging the use of the invention by Ford customers. The value of
this prolongation of use may itself be very difficult to determine.
8
Instant case at 508 (quoting Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film
Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 517 (1917), and citing Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv.
Co., 320 U.S. 661, 666-67 (1944)).
9 Instant case at 508.

1o Id.at 523.
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of his having done one or more of the following: . . . (2)
licensed or authorized another to perform acts which if performed
without his consent would constitute contributory infringement
of the patent; (3) sought to enforce his patent rights against
infringement or contributory infringement.'1
Justice Brennan's interpretation of section 284 as limiting patentees'
recovery to provable damages, in the sense of what the patentee would
have made had the infringing activity been authorized from the start, also
might be said to contravene the statutory language that "upon finding
for the claimant the court shall award the claimant damages adequate to
compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable
."..
1
royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer .
However, Justice Brennan pointed out that traditionally "what the infringer makes is 'profits'; what the owner of the patent loses by such
infringement is 'damages.' "'3 Prior to 1946 the damages statute entitled
the patentee to recover his damages and the infringer's profits. 14 The
word "profits" was dropped in 1946.15 Justice Brennan argued that this
deletion evidences congressional intent to make only provable damages
recoverable and that "the statute allows the award of a reasonable
royalty . . . only if such amount constitutes 'damages' for the infringement." 16 The opinion as a whole, and particularly the measure of damages
described, indicates that the Justice meant by this language simply that
the patentee could recover a reasonable royalty only once for each patented
product manufactured and not reconstructed.
Congressional intent affirmatively to remove the possibility of using
the infringer's profits as a measure of recovery seems uncertain at best. 17
Stronger support for the one-recovery theory lies in section 271 (c) itself.
Justice Brennan pointed out that the legislative history of that provision
demonstrates a purpose only to give patentees a remedy where suit against
the direct infringer is impractical.' 8 Granting -recovery against Aro
would encourage patentees to allow a manufacturer to infringe and then
1135 U.S.C. § 271(d) (1958).
12 35 U.S.C. §284 (1958). (Emphasis added.)
13

Instant case at 505 (citing Duplate Corp. v. Triplex Safety Glass Co., 298

U.S. 448 (1936)).
4

1 REv. STAT. § 4921 (1875), as amended, ch. 58, § 8, 42 Stat. 392 (1922):
"[U]pon a decree being rendered in any such case for an infringement the complainant shall be entitled to recover, in addition to the profits to be accounted for by
the defendant, the damages the complainant has sustained thereby . . ..
15 Act of Aug. 1, 1946, ch. 726, 60 Stat 778, as amended, 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1958).
16 Instant case at 505.
17 "[T]he bill would not preclude the recovery of profits as an element of general
damages .

.

.

."

S. RF-a. No. 1503, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1946); H.R. REP. No.

-1587, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1946). The reports do not say whose profits, those
made by the infringer or those the patentee would have made, could be an "element"
of general damages, but since the language which was removed referred to the
infringer's profits, the reports may have been referring to them also.
1
8 Instant case at 511.
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to recover increased compensation by suing suppliers of users. The
patentee would then be able to control not only the market for the
patented invention but also the market for unpatented supplies. In view
of the Supreme Court's history of strict construction of patentees' rights,'9
it would seem that Congress would have made explicit any such intention
it might have had. On the basis of the legislative history, it could be
argued that patentees must attempt to recover against the direct infringer
where practical, and only afterward go against contributory infringers.
Although such an argument has no support in the statutory language, the
Court may in the future adopt it, especially in light of the dissenters'
statement that fairness would require a patentee to try to recover from an
infringing manufacturer before pressing its claims against either unauthorized users or contributory infringers.20
Justice Brennan's one-recovery theory does not necessarily limit the
patentee's recovery to a "reasonable royalty" in all situations. The
recovery allowed is what the patentee actually would have made had the
infringing activity been authorized.2 ' Thus a patentee who did not license
his patent but rather manufactured and sold the patented articles should
be able to recover profits he would have made had he manufactured and
sold the infringing articles himself. Nevertheless, Brennan's view does
imply that once a patentee has licensed his patent, he can recover only
the value of a license from an infringer. Presumably the patentee also
can obtain an injunction against further infringing activity. 22 Legislative
history makes it clear that Congress did not intend to limit patentees'
recovery for infringement to a "reasonable royalty." 2
As a practical matter the one-recovery theory will result in contributory infringers rarely being held liable. The public has a valid interest
in providing incentive for prospective inventors.2 4 On the other hand
the public also has a legitimate interest in tolerating only the minimum
necessary restraints on trade.2 5 Where, as in the present case, the alleged
'9 See, e.g., Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944);
Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942); Adams v. Burke, 84
U.S. (17 Wall.) 453 (1873).
2o Instant case at 523-24 (Black, J., dissenting).
21 This view overrules a dictum in Birdsell v. Shaliol, 112 U.S. 485, 487-88 (1884),
that one who pays damages for selling a patented invention without authority from
the patentee does not give his vendee any right to use the invention. See instant
case at 513.
22 35 U.S.C. § 283 (1958) : "The several courts having jurisdiction of cases under
this title may grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity to prevent
the violation of any right secured by patent, on such terms as the court deems
reasonable."
23 S. REP. No. 1503, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1946); H.R. RP.
No. 1587, 79th
Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1946); Hearings on H.R. 5231 Before the House Committee on
Patents, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 20-21 (1946).
2 See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8: "The Congress shall have Power . . . to promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries . ... "
25 See Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453 (1873); Sherman Act, ch. 647,

26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1958).
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contributory infringer did not appropriate the "essence" of the patentee's
invention, it would seem that the balance between the interests in providing
incentive for inventors and in free and unfettered commerce is correctly
weighed in favor of free trade. One recovery for the patentee would seem
to be enough to encourage invention.
Although it limits patentees to one recovery for the infringing activity
which may result from an infringing sale, Justice Brennan's view could
still lead to substantial restraints being placed upon suppliers of replacement parts for articles which the supplier knows are claimed by a patentee
to be infringing. The supplier must judge whether suit against the direct
infringer is practical for the patentee before risking sale. He may be
enjoined from selling the supplies pending full recovery against the direct
infringer. Furthermore, the application of section 271(c) to Aro paves
the way for some recoveries against suppliers of replacement parts which,
although "especially adapted" for use in the infringing machine, lack the
characteristics of a patentable "invention." In the present case, although
it may have recovered fully from Ford, CTR was able to tie up Aro in
a lengthy law suit which twice went to the Supreme Court.
Mr. Justice Black argued that unpatentable supplies are in the public
domain and cannot be protected under the "constitutional plan of a
competitive economy free from patent monopolies except where there are
patentable 'Discoveries.' "26 The four dissenters, then, probably would
either hold section 271 (c) unconstitutional or limit it to sales of patentable
elements-items which, but for the inarful wording of the patent claim by
the patentee, could have been covered expressly by the terms of the
grant.27 What is generally recognized 28 as the first case of contributory
infringement involved a patentable element of a patented combination.2
The facts of that case were repeatedly used to justify the proposed contributory infringement section at legislative hearings.8 0 One court of
appeals has suggested that section 271 (c) applies only to the sale of
patentable elements, 3 and the House and Senate reports lend support to
26 Instant case at 522. But see Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement
Co., 365 U.S. 336, 347-48 (1961) (Black, J., concurring) : "The language and history

of . . . [section 271] show plainly: . . . that Congress wanted to continue in force,

but not expand, the judge-made doctrine of contributory infringement under which

a person who knowingly aids, encourages or abets the direct infringement of a
patent is to be held liable as a contributory infringer . .. ."
27 As a third possibility they might argue that § 271 (c) applies only to persons
who supply to an infringing manufacturer (not user or repairer).
28 Hearings on H.R. 3866 Before Subcommittee No. 4 of the House Committee
on the Judiciary, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 17, at 3 (1950).
29 Wallace v. Holmes, 29 Fed. Cas. 74 (No. 17100) (C.C.D. Conn. 1871).
30 Hearings on H.R. 3760 Before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Committee
on the Judiciary, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 9, at 156, 158 (1951); Hearings on H.R.
3866, supra note 28, at 3-8; Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademharks, and Copyrights of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 80th Cong., 2d

Sess.,31ser. 21, at 7-9 (1948).
Dr. Salsbury's Labs. v. I. D. Russell Co. Labs., 212 F.2d 414 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 837 (1954). Contra, Southern States Equip. Corp. v. USCO Power
Equip. Corp., 209 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1953).
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this view.32 This reading of section 271 (c), in effect, would permit the
courts to reform the patent grant in those cases where the "essence" of
the patented invention could otherwise be marketed by unauthorized
parties without violating the express terms of the patent grant. This
interpretation may provide a simpler, more administrable way of protecting
patentees' valid rights and at the same time prevent them from extending
their monopolies beyond the scope necessary to exploit their inventions.
It would also result in less restraint being imposed on suppliers of
replacement parts. ,
[The doctrine of contributory infringement] has been applied to enjoin
those who sought to cause infringement by supplying someone else with the
means and directions for infringing a patent. One who makes a special device
constituting the heart of a patented machine and supplies it to others with
directions (specific or implied) to complete the machine is obviously appropriating the benefit of the patented invention. . . . The principle of contributory infringement is set forth in the provisions of [§ 271(c)] . ". . which
is concerned with the usual situation in which contributory infringement
arises.
S. REP. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1952); H.R. REP. No. 1923, 82d Cong.,
2d Sess. 9 (1952).
The legislative history sheds no light as to the intended scope of 35 U.S.C.
§271(b) (1958), which provides that "whoever actively induces infringement of a
patent shall be liable as an infringer." According to a draftsman of § 271, "the most
practical suggestion on the interpretation of this section [271(b)] would be to look
away from precedents and 'let your conscience be your guide."' Rich, Infringentent
Under Section 271 of the Patent Act of 1952, 21 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 521, 538 (1953).
32

